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In the past the economic consequences of the terrorism were considered only as a by-product of that particular form of violent conflict. It was focused and in effect it still is -- on the enlargement of the audience & the intensity of terror, because through it the terrorism expects to attain its political goals. The vulnerability of the modern societies & of the global economy, as well as the greater destruction power of the modern technologies & the amplification effect of the media of the information society, have raised the attention of both the terrorists & the States on the economic consequences of this kind of violent conflict. Bin Laden has furthermore envisaged the possibility to win an economic war of attrition against the Western economy. In effect, the conventional terrorism doesn't have such a power. The losses & damages are irrelevant in relation to the population & the wealth of nations. Only with the use of weapons of mass destruction (& disruption!) the terrorism could reach that potentiality. Anyway, the economic consequences of the modern transnational terrorism are far from irrelevant. They are multifarious in nature & timing. As far as their nature is concerned, a difference must be made from the losses & damages, from the direct effects & the indirect ones, from the damages of the terrorist actions & those produced by the prevention & security measures, from the material damages & those linked by the \"fear economy,\" &, last but not least, from those of the \"occasional terrorism\" (September 11th) & those of the \"recurrent\" one (IRA, ETA, Intifada, etc.), that is of the terrorist campaigns. As far as the time of damages is concerned the immediate, short & long term impacts have to be considered. The actual impacts on the economy, the society & the politics depend on the one side on the existence of a \"security culture\" & on the other side on the emergency institutional communication. This latter could either hinder or expand the damages, fear & panic, both through the people & areas involved in a terrorist attack & outside. Adapted from the source document.

In the past the economic consequences of the terrorism were considered only as a by-product of that particular form of violent conflict. It was focused – and in effect it still is – on the enlargement of the audience and the intensity of terror, because through it the terrorism expects to attain its political goals. The vulnerability of the modern societies and of the global economy, as well as the greater destruction power of the modern technologies and the amplification effect of the media of the information society, have raised the attention of both the terrorists and the States on the economic consequences of this kind of violent conflict. Bin Laden has furthermore envisaged the possibility to win an economic war of attrition against the Western economy. In effect, the conventional terrorism doesn't have such a power. The losses and damages are irrelevant in relation to the population and the wealth of nations. Only with the use of weapons of mass destruction (and disruption!) the terrorism could reach that potentiality. Anyway, the economic consequences of the modern transnational terrorism are far from irrelevant. They are multifarious in nature and timing. As far as their nature is concerned, a difference must be made from the losses and damages, from the direct effects and the indirect ones, from the damages of the terrorist actions and those produced by the prevention and security measures, from the material damages and those linked by the \"fear economy\", and, last but not least, from those of the \"occasional terrorism\" (september 11th) and those of the \"recurrent\" one (IRA, ETA, Intifada, etc.), that is of the terrorist campaigns. As far as the time of damages is concerned the immediate, short and long term impacts have to be considered. The actual impacts on the economy, the society and the politics depend on the one side on the existence of a \"security culture\" and on the other side on the emergency institutional communication. This latter could either hinder or expand the damages, fear and panic, both through the people and areas involved in a terrorist attack and outside.

The paper examines, from a geo-economic point of view, the relevance for Europe and Italy of the Mediterranean and the Danubian-Balkan areas. After the analysis of the most critical aspects of the initiatives involving the above regions - that is, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe - the focus is posed on the main analogies and differences of the two areas from both the geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives. Some key factors are regarded to play a crucial role in the de-velopment and internationalization of both regions: good governance, anti-corruption policy, \"state and institutions building\", rule of law, etc. Addition-ally, some policy evaluations are suggested aimed at enhancing the interven-tion of the international community within the two areas. An assessment follows about the role, interests and perspectives of Italy in both areas, as well as its comparative advantages with respect to the other countries of the euro zone. From this respect, Italy may accomplish an important role of \"bridge\" between the two sides.